The Hidden Tyranny of Transparency
"Every truly great accomplishment is at first impossible," said U.S. Homeland Security Under Secretary for research and development Jay Cohen to an audience of innovators at BIF-3 on October 11th. Prior to his post with Homeland Security, Cohen was head of naval research. His directive was very clear: make the navy more innovative. "When I took over naval research, it was an organization with 232 years of tradition unhampered by progress," he said.
Cohen went on to describe how he brought the naval/coast guard “x-craft” (x meaning experimental) to the high seas. This large, modular, high-speed prototype ship was built to commercial specs for less than $90 million. It was the largest and fastest naval craft of its kind intended as an experimental platform to design and test interchangeable systems, each intended for specific uses, such as anti-submarine work, amphibious landing support, cargo transport and launch and recovery of surface and underwater vehicles. The concept is similar to a commercial truck that can carry containers, logs or liquids, depending on what's attached to it. Cohen described it as a militarized container ship. And guess what? It actually worked. It had speed, stealth and flexibility. The navy loved it and ordered more. Cohen delivered on his directive.
Unfortunately, Cohen’s experiment stumbled badly once it got out of the lab and into the real world. His working, proven prototype ended up a bloated, defense contract mess. Massive cost overruns led to congressional inquiries. In this case, bureaucracy killed the cat. "I didn’t appreciate the strength and power of bureaucracy. The not invented here." said Cohen. "I live my life in not invented yet. As soon as naval sea systems came in, instead of building to [the prototype] commercial standards, they overlayed all their requirements on top of it."
In theory, open innovation and transparency of systems and products and ideas is a novel aspiration. Yet in a big bureaucratic organizations, it can be a real buzz kill. Cohen’s story reminded of an essay by Elting Morison (Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study of Innovation) which talks about how difficult (downright impossible) it was for the navy to accept another innovation, continuous aim firing. It didn't matter that the maverick behind the idea had the facts on his side too:
In 1899 five ships of the North Atlantic Squadron fired five minutes each at a lightship hulk at the conventional range of 1600 yards. After twenty-five minutes of banging away, two hits had been made on the sails of the elderly vessel. Six years later one naval gunner made fifteen hits in one minute at a target 75 by 25 feet at the same range – 1600 yards; half of them hit in a bull’s-eye 50 inch square.
As incomprehensible as it sounds, the navy refused to adopt the new technology, remaining steadfast in its commitment to the status quo. What was the eventual tipping point? An order from the top—Teddy Roosevelt himself got involved.
It wasn’t until I watched Cohen’s story again at our Innovation Story Studio that I realized how relevant his experience is to the BIF community. He's got a tough job ahead of him. He called Homeland Security an incredible experiment in nuclear fusion – taking 22 disparate agencies (i.e. coast guard, transportation, border control, etc.) and trying to force them together. He also said that he would not allow a failure of imagination on his watch.
But he also has to figure out a way to translate his experimental success back into the real world. That’s the value of the Business Innovation Factory. More than just a test bed for innovation, we also help our project sponsors prepare for that eventual successful experiment, and enable them to absorb and communicate the outcomes. Without that crucial step, companies are left with what Jay Cohen called his x-craft: an innovation success story with an end result of the Littoral combat ship which didn't benefit anyone.
Cohen talked a lot about the use of deception and “disguising to the max” to foster imagination and creativity in a bureaucratic system. He also talked about understanding the politics of innovation. It’s intriguing and fertile ground for continued research. If you have examples from the private sector, let me know.
RELATED LINKS:
Watch Jay Cohen at BIF-3
Read my profile about Jay Cohen
BIF ALSO RECOMMENDS
I had a tough time following Dr. Terry Pierce’s story about the navy’s transition in the 1920s from battleships to carrier aviation. Upon further research, it’s actually a great story about deceptive innovation. Here’s an article by Jan M. van Tol (former commander of the USS O’Brien) which gets into the mindsets necessary for change. A key question van Tol asks, and answers: What was it like to be a senior officer then, with responsibility for evaluating new concepts that might supplant or change the paradigm in which he had served?
Posted November 2, 2007 10:34 AM by Chris Flanagan | Permalink
